

## **International Society and World Order: War, Conflict and the State\***

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### **Introduction**

One of the distinguishing features of International Relations (IR) theory, when compared with other theories in the social sciences is that it has a global perspective. Global problems - war, ethnic and communal conflicts, terrorism, absolute poverty, mass unemployment, ecological deterioration, racial and sexual discrimination, and the oppression of human rights are issues which International Relations cannot, therefore, ignore. If IR theory does not explore global problems, its *raison d'être* will be lost.

But, with the notable exception of war, global problems have not been the subject matter of IR theory. This has been attributed to "the hegemony of realism" <sup>1</sup> in IR, further elaborated in Kalevi Holsti's explanation that "the hegemony of the classical tradition" <sup>2</sup> has been understood as the accepted definition of realism. According to Holsti, this includes the causes of war and the conditions of peace, the essential actors, and their images of the world. IR theory has traditionally revolved around these three key questions, the first of which is absolutely essential, the *raison d'être* of the field, with the other two providing the location for solutions to the problem. Therefore the essential question is problems of war and peace, the essential actors are sovereign states that engage in war and provide peace, and the primary image is of a world made up of sovereign states.<sup>3</sup> As far as there is the hegemony of realism in IR, it become obsolete and obsolescent. Because global problems pose the serious challenge to the state-centric view of realism's hegemony over IR.

Among global problems, ethnic and communal conflicts are forcing a change in the subject matter of IR theory that realism defines. Recent data show that there were ninety-four armed conflicts in the period 1989-94, but only four were inter-state wars.<sup>4</sup> Almost all of the reported conflicts were internal. Richard Rubenstein points out that communal violence has become in a relatively short time the murderer of the world's peoples.<sup>5</sup> These facts suggest that the subject matter of IR theory has to be reconsidered keeping the following observations in mind. First of all, the absence of war does not necessarily mean peace. Even if the causes of war are eliminated, conditions will not necessarily be peaceful. In order to build the conditions of peace, we have to examine not only the causes of war, but also of violent conflicts. Second, although the sovereign states are the main actors in international society, they are also parties to ethnic conflicts. Because the sovereign states engage in ethnic conflicts, they can not provide peace. Third, while wars are conflicts between the states, ethnic conflicts are conflicts between the state and ethnic groups or between ethnic groups. It is often impossible to distinguish problems in international relations from internal ones. International society can not be studied in the context only of the state-centric viewpoint. We need a broader theoretical framework to understand and analyze global problems.

In this paper I present a theoretical framework to explain the causes of global problems and movements formed in response to them. I am calling it world order.<sup>6</sup> World order is not static but

dynamic. In the world order, international society is being transformed, the world economy is globalizing, a global civil society is emerging and global problems are deepening. Within this framework I am not defining international society and world order as competing theoretical models. I am defining international society as one of the systems found in the world order. Furthermore, war must not be understood as a problem only of international society but also of world order. IR theory that concerns itself only with the traditionally defined domain of international society can not explore ethnic conflicts. IR theory that concerns itself with the world order as a theoretical model can, on the other hand search for and discover the causes of ethnic conflicts. Only if we could know the causes of such conflicts, which are examples of global problems, can we find clues with which to resolve them.

In what follows the main concern is with world order as it relates to war and conflicts. To understand wars and conflicts in the world order we have to focus on states as political entities. Because the states are parties to wars and conflicts, they could also become parties to their solution. But first, what is meant by the term world order? How can we understand global problems in the world order? Second, what is meant by international society? In particular we must seek to understand how have wars been existed in international society? Third, How can we understand the causes of ethnic conflicts in the context of world order? Finally this article suggests that ethnic conflicts can be resolved and conditions of peace be attained peacefully.

## World order

Traditionally, the state-centric viewpoint has been dominant in IR. But world order as a theoretical model has an alternative viewpoint, a human-centered viewpoint. What is the meaning of human-centered viewpoint of world order? Some contemporary researchers have recently developed this viewpoint. J. David Singer, for example, suggests a systematic research model that can “think big” and “think small” simultaneously. By this he means that “research embraces in a rigorous synthesis both the lone individual and all of mankind.”<sup>7</sup> The concept necessary to connect the human individual and the human being is “basic human needs.”<sup>8</sup> Basic human needs are inherent in the human individual and are common to all human beings. But “need” is not the only concept defined in such terms. A want, a wish, a desire, and a demand are similar in a nature to a need. According to Johan Galtung, a need should be distinguished from these concepts. While the latter are subjectively felt and articulated, need is tied to the concept of necessity. The concept of “need” gives us an image of what is necessary to be human, an image generally considered to have universal characteristics. The term “human” suggests that the need-subject is an individual. Perhaps the only subjects we can truly know in human affairs are individual human beings. And the term “basic” serves to further qualify the notion of a need as a necessary condition, as a condition that must be met, at least to the extent that the need-subject be able to function as a human being. Briefly stated, needs equal basic human needs, for needs are human and basic.<sup>9</sup> The human-centered viewpoint is based on a basic human needs theory that synthesizes the notions of the human individual and the human being.

World order consists of four systems. The first system is international society. The main actors of international society are the states, international organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The second system is the world economy. Corporations, banks, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization are the main actors in the world economy. The third system consists of responses to the conditions made by international society and the world economy. Examples include ethnic conflicts, terrorism, the

labour movements and human rights movements. Actors in the third system respond to first and second system conditions in both violent and nonviolent ways to satisfy human needs. In contrast to the other three systems, the fourth system is essentially passive, rather than active. The fourth system consists of individuals and peoples whose freedom, identity, well-being and human needs have been eroded. Examples include the poor, the homeless, victims of violence, and persons suffering the loss or repression of their human rights. Such people live not only in developing countries but also in the developed countries. There is, in short, a dualism in the world order. This dualism in the world order is not between developing countries and developed countries but between first three systems and the fourth system.<sup>10</sup>

What does the human individual relate to these systems in the world order? In other words, can basic human needs theory explain the four systems in world order? It can be assumed that theoretically international society relates to peace and world economy to development. Peace is most relevant to international society. Development is most relevant to world economy. In terms of basic human needs theory, peace equals development, and vice versa. As explained by Galtung,

Peace I, narrow meaning: absence of war between states

Peace II, broad meaning: absence of direct and structural violence between and within states, realizing survival + well-being + identity + freedom for all; in other words satisfaction of human needs, and ecological balance.

Development I, narrow meaning: economic growth, GNP, productivity, etc.

Development II, broad meaning: the satisfaction of human needs, the minimum people cannot do without, for all—survival + well-being + identity + freedom; and in addition, ecological balance.<sup>11</sup>

Thus, taken in their broad meanings, peace = development = satisfaction of human needs.<sup>12</sup> It can be said that international society is relevant to peace and the world economy is relevant to development. Furthermore, peace is not the absence of war but the absence of violence, where violence is defined as “avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible.”<sup>13</sup> Therefore peace means satisfaction of human needs. Development cannot be defined so narrowly as to mean only the development of the states, but also of the human individual. Development equals human development. In addition, the negation of development should be understood as “maldevelopment”: a concept which includes not only underdevelopment but also “overdevelopment.” The state of overdevelopment is defined as a condition in which material increases impede human development.<sup>14</sup> While maldevelopment thus means a situation that does not satisfy basic human needs, development means a situation that satisfies human needs.

When basic human needs are not satisfied, “inaction” or “reaction”<sup>15</sup> will occur at the individual, social and global levels. At the individual level, as Erich Fromm argues, “if he lives under conditions which are contrary to his nature and to his basic requirements for human growth and sanity, he cannot help reacting; he must either deteriorate and perish, or bring about conditions which are more in accordance with his needs.”<sup>16</sup> The individual whose human needs are not satisfied becomes inactive or reactive. Death, disease, and indifference are forms of inaction. But the individual reacts to the conditions that disturb him or her to satisfy human needs. That person is often labeled deviant. John W. Burton argues that without the satisfaction of human needs the

individual will find the norms of society in which he or she behaves to be inappropriate because these norms cannot to be used by him or her to secure his or her needs. He or she will invent his or her own norms and be labeled deviant, or disrupt himself or herself as a person, rather than forego these needs.<sup>17</sup>

At the social level, when the society does not satisfy human needs, it will become inactive or reactive. A society characterized by social inaction suffers from anomie, apathy, and the withdrawal of its members from social activity. Individuals in such societies tend to be marginalized, alienated and exploited structurally. These are defined as the root causes of social problems. Such a society may be stable but violent and maldevelopmental because it does not fulfill the conditions to meet human needs.

There are two kinds of social reaction to the society that fails to satisfy human needs. One is a violent and destructive reaction and the other is a nonviolent and constructive one. The former category includes societies which experience terrorism, revolts, ethnic conflicts, and civil wars. Such a society is so violent that people cannot help reacting violently, even when there are nonviolent alternatives. According to Burton, they are "observable symptoms of unobservable motivations and needs."<sup>18</sup> Paradoxically the reactions make the society more violent and destructive.

The latter is the society that is challenged by constructive reactions, that is proposed by social movements. As R.J.B.Walker argues, "Social movements have always arisen under conditions of social distress."<sup>19</sup> Symptoms of social distress include poverty, the threat of war, environmental degradation, and the abuse of human rights. Social movements respond to social distress. For example, developmental NGOs deal with poverty, peace movements oppose war, environmental movements challenge policies leading to environmental degradation and human rights movements warn of the consequences of human rights abuses.<sup>20</sup> One aspect of social movements is the constructive response to society that cannot satisfy human needs, and the other is "the explicit rejection of violence."<sup>21</sup> When social movements resort to violence, they become destructive reactions. When basic human needs are not satisfied, social movements must react nonviolently.

Social inaction and destructive social reactions to social problems are themselves social problems. Constructive responses, on the other hand are closely related to civil society. Because social movement are one of the most important institutions of civil society. Martin Shaw points out that as classically described civil society is constituted by churches, press, trade unions, but in modern terms new social movements and campaigns."<sup>22</sup> As long as social movements tackle social problems, civil society can be said to have the power to resolve them. As R.J.B.Walker and Saul Mendilovitz argue that social movements provide some of the most creative response to the challengers of the age.<sup>23</sup>

Finally at the global level, social inaction corresponds to the fourth system, and social response to the third system. The third system has been described as having two types: one destructive and the other constructive. If international society and the world economy do not satisfy human needs, the third system tends to respond either destructively or constructively. Just as social inaction and destructive social reaction are social problems, the fourth system and destructive third system reactions are global problems. The nature of the fourth system and the third system is different. But if those who live in the fourth system become conscious of their situation and want to change it, they will form third system movements. The fourth system can thus become the third system. The expansion of destructive third system will be deepening global problems. Therefore, the whole world order will be in a more dangerous situation. But the expansion of constructive third system creates the opportunity to solve global problems. The constructive third system can be understood to mean

global civil society. Even though civil society is nationally framed and social movements are formed mostly within national civil societies,<sup>24</sup> the roots of social movements are in the reaction to the problems that do not satisfy universal human needs. Social problems are global problems. Social movements at the local and national level are tackling aspects of global problems. There is, in short a "local-global nexus."<sup>25</sup> But there is also the problem of states between local-global nexus. The very states is particularly relevant to one of global problems, that is wars. Therefore, we have to consider the nature of international society.

### International society and war

By international society I mean the system of states. It is generally thought that the modern system of states was formed at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. According to Martin Wight, Westphalia signals the transition from religious to secular politics, from Christendom to Europe, the exclusion from international politics of the Holy See, the effective end of the Holy Roman Empire by the virtual recognition of the sovereignty of its members, The formal admission of the United Provinces and the Swiss Confederation to the family of independent nations, the beginning of the system by the balance of power.<sup>26</sup> The Peace of Westphalia provided foundation of the system of states.

But the Peace of Westphalia is not the origin of modern international society. Before the modern system of states was formed, states or the precursors of modern states had to have already achieved conditions of sovereignty. Sovereignty can be understood as having internal and external aspects. Hedley Bull defines internal sovereignty as having "supremacy over all other authorities within that territory and population" and by external sovereignty, "not supremacy but independence of outside authorities." Sovereign states have existed both at a normative level and at a factual level. The states which claim the rights of sovereignty, but can not assert this right in practice, can not properly be called sovereign states.<sup>27</sup> In fact, many states could not survive. Sovereign states have causally connected to intra-state wars and inter-state wars.

First of all, to establish the internal sovereignty, the states have to have been formed. Internal sovereignty and state making are very closely related. In the process of state formation, wars have been a major influence on the states from about the sixteenth century to the present. According to Richard Bean, at the end of fifteenth century the size of armies increased sharply, as did the revenues of central governments and their expenditures on military affairs, and finally, between the years 1450 to 1550 A.D, the first generation of European nation-states coalesced under the control of central authority.<sup>28</sup> State making and war making were causally connected. Charles Tilly argues that "war made the state, and the state made war"<sup>29</sup> and explains this causality as follows:

In an idealized sequence, a great lord made war so effectively as to become dominant in a substantial territory, but that war making led to increased extraction of the means of war — men, arms, food, lodging, transportation, supplies, and/or the money to buy them — from the population within that territory. The building up of war-making capacity likewise increased the capacity to extract. The very activity of extraction, if successful, entailed the elimination, neutralization, or cooptation of the great lord's local rivals; thus it led to state making. As a by-product, it created organization in the form of tax-collection agencies, police forces, courts, exchequers, account keepers; thus it again led state making.<sup>30</sup>

A state that successfully eradicates its rivals strengthens its ability to extract resources, to wage war, and to protect its chief supporters.<sup>31</sup> As a result of intra-state wars, the states were able

to create structures of them.

Furthermore, the creation of states is dependent on authority having been established. The authority of the state is based on the principle of legitimacy, nationally and internationally. Following the French Revolution, at both national and international levels, the dynastic principle of legitimacy was superseded by popular principle of legitimacy. The dynastic principle of legitimacy is based on the status and claims of the rulers. The popular principle, on the other hand is based on the claims and consent of the governed: self-determination is now the primary basis of the principle of popular legitimacy.<sup>32</sup> National self-determination is thus the basis of the nation-state. Historically the modern nation-state has displayed the development sequence of state first, nation second.

At present, however, many states in Asia and Africa cannot be said to have accomplished the task of state-making yet. Bull and Adam Watson call those states pseudo-states or quasi-states, like those that existed in Europe before the age of Richelieu.<sup>33</sup> They are governments or regimes, and exercise power over persons and control over territory, but they do not possess authority, as distinct from mere power; they do not possess enduring the legal and administrative structures, capable of outlasting the individuals who wield power at any one time; still less do they reflect respect for constitutions or acceptance of the rule of law.<sup>34</sup> How can such states continue to exist in international society? Because, as Robert Jackson answers, the quasi-states are creatures of changes in the rules of membership and modes of operation of international society which constitute the deliberate replacement for the institutions of European overseas colonization.<sup>35</sup> Thus, the meaning of sovereignty has changed. These quasi-states do not possess "positive sovereignty" demonstrated by a capacity effective and civil government, but instead possess "negative sovereignty" that is characterized only by enfranchised external rights and responsibilities. This is a condition of merely juridical statehood derived from a right of self-determination.<sup>36</sup> External sovereignty is given to quasi-states by international society. They exist as independent states at a normative level, as members of international society.

A second major consideration is the relationship between sovereign states and inter-state wars. International society can be said to have two aspects, the struggle for power by sovereign states and international institutions made by them. The causes of wars are inherent in the struggle for power, however the scope of and effect of wars are often restricted by international institutions. According to Hans Morgenthau, in a world whose moving force is the aspiration of sovereign nations for power, peace can be maintained by either of two devices: the balance of power and normative limitations on the exercise of power.<sup>37</sup> The balance of power can be defined "a state of affairs such that no one power is in one position where it is preponderant and can lay down to the others." <sup>38</sup> The goals of the balance of power are not peace in the sense of insuring the absence of wars, but the stability of the state system and the independence of the states. Morgenthau argues that the system of maintaining the balance of power succeeds in accomplishing these goals as follows,

In explaining its nature and operation, we have stressed its inevitable connection with, and protective function for, a multiple-state system. Throughout its history of more than four hundred years the policy of the balance of power succeeded in preventing any one state from gaining universal domination. It also succeeded in preserving the existence of all members of the modern state system from the conclusion of the Thirty Year's War in 1648 to the partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. Yet universal dominion by any one state was prevented only at the price of warfare, which from 1648 to 1815 was virtually continuous and in the twentieth century has twice engulfed practically the whole world.<sup>39</sup>

While "peace" maintained through the exercise of the balance of power is attained by war, war is restricted by international institution. War is an international institution on a par with international law and diplomacy. War is institutionalized by international society. According to Bull, war is a form of organized violence carried out by political units against each other.<sup>40</sup> These "political units" have been defined as sovereign states, in short, war is organized violence waged by sovereign states. Sovereign states have sought to preserve for themselves a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. War is not just a violent conflict such as civil war, rebel and ethnic conflict. War is not just an international conflict such a trade war or the Cold War. And war is not just an international violence such as an international terrorism. War is an international violent conflict that sovereign states engage in. Because war is the primary means of maintaining or achieving the balance of power and is institutionalized in international society, peace can not be attained by peaceful means in international society.

### World order and conflict

That states and international society can not provide peace through peaceful means has not only a narrow meaning but also a broad one, because the states are parties to violent conflicts that international society does not deal with explicitly. According to Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff, communal rivalries and ethnic challenges to the states contributed to conflicts in all but twenty-two of the "hot" wars in 1993.<sup>41</sup> Most of these hot wars are conflicts between the state and ethnic groups. Walker Connor argues that the concept of self-determination of ethno-nationalism contains the seeds of a radical redrawing of today's political map.<sup>42</sup> According to Dov Ronen, historically there are five types of self-determination: national self-determination, class self-determination, minorities self-determination, non-European/racial self-determination, and ethnic self-determination. At present ethnic self-determination is dominant, and its emergence threatens the breakup of states.<sup>43</sup> Thus the states and international society are being challenged by ethnic groups. These groups mainly constitute the destructive third system in world order when they respond to the states and international society violently.

What does ethnic self-determination mean? Is it related to human needs theory? Connor defines ethnic group as "a basic human category" characterized by unity of race and culture.<sup>44</sup> Ronen argues that the quest for self-determination, an idea connoting freedom and not a legal term, is basically an individual quest. Lack of conceptualization and the improbability of realizing individual freedom alone, leads human beings to seek out or form communities as vehicles for political development and the formation or confirmation of a social identity.<sup>45</sup> Ethnic self-determination can, therefore, be seen as closely related to two fundamental human needs: the need for identity and the need for freedom. When these needs are not satisfied by the social conditions in a modern nation state, the quest for ethnic identity is activated and ethnic groups collectively react to the conditions of the state. Therefore, the popular principle of legitimacy can not be based only on the concept of the nation, but rooted in the self-identification of individuals as members of diverse ethnic groups.

Ethnic groups, as the base for this working out of identity politics, are challenging two types of the states. One is the empirical state which has managed to evolve into a sovereign nation-state. The other is the juridical state, defined above as a quasi-state. But there is no difference between them. Both are fundamentally related to political legitimacy. According to Connor's view, it is necessary to link political legitimacy and ethnic identity. "The doctrine [of self-determination] makes ethnicity the ultimate measure of political legitimacy, by holding that any self-differentiating people, simply

because it is a people, has the right, should it so desire, to rule itself.”<sup>46</sup> A contrasting view of the ultimate measure of political legitimacy is not ethnicity but human needs. Christian Bay defines legitimacy as follows:

the only acceptable justification of government, which also determines the limits to its legitimate authority, is its task of serving human needs - serving them better than would be done without any government. The only acceptable justification of a particular form of government, which again determines the limits on its legitimate demand on the individual's obedience and loyalty, is that it serves to meet human needs better than other forms of government.<sup>47</sup>

In this model, legitimacy is defined as satisfying human needs including ethnic identity. If the state in a multi-ethnic society does not have a legitimate government, the state will be challenged by ethnic groups seeking self-determination. In some cases the states that are empirical states or quasi-states are and will be destroyed by ethnic challenges.

But when the quasi-states are challenged with ethnic groups, they are faced with more serious problems than empirical states. While the quasi-states have not accomplished state making yet, they are enjoying international legitimacy. Even though the quasi-states are given rights of international legitimacy, they lack internal legitimacy. As a result the quasi-states are faced with severe internal security problems. Caroline Thomas argues that the primary physical threats to the security of the overwhelming number of the Third World states are internal, not external.<sup>48</sup> National security problems in the quasi-states are not external problems, but internal ones such as terrorism, secessionism, irredentism and ethnic conflicts.

In seeking appropriate models of state building, the European experiences of nation-state building do more harm than good to the quasi-state. First, the rivals of developing state powering Europe were the lords of the old regime, or the aristocracy. The populations were more homogeneous than the mix of ethnic groups found in most contemporary quasi-states. While wars had a major impact on the development of national identities in Europe, wars activate ethnic identity quests in the quasi-states. Second, leaders of the quasi-states may resort to warfare as a stage for nation building. According to Jeffrey Herbst, because of not fighting wars, leaders may find that, despite all their efforts, economic reform can not progress and they can not inspire their citizenry to unite around national symbols. The incentives that leaders have to incite wars for the purposes of state making are significant and may become much stronger in the future when the futility of domestic reform during times of business as usual, that is, peace, become clear.<sup>49</sup> There is also a possibility that wars will occur in the quasi-states. Mohammed Ayoob argues that intra-security problems often get transformed inter-state conflicts.<sup>50</sup>

It is unclear whether wars will contribute to state-making in the quasi-states or not. But the possibility that wars may occur in the quasi-states cannot be denied. Even if warfare does contribute to state making, people in the quasi-states will become victim of wars. These are the people in the world most at risk, those who constitute the members of the fourth system, as referred to above, in the world order.

## Conclusion

To solve conflicts including wars, the states have to change peacefully. If the states are not and can not be changed by themselves and other powers, the destructive third system will change states and international society violently and the fourth system will grow. There are at least two



possibilities to change the states. The first possibility is that states change by themselves. It is, in essence, through the solution of conflicts that the authority of states is legitimized. Burton argues the final goal of conflict resolution is the establishment of the legitimacy of authority, the creation of institutions that serve the needs of those over whom authority is exercised, and the promotion of values attached to relationships between authorities and people.<sup>51</sup> Conflict resolution must concern itself with creating political structures that meet human needs. If the political structure is not legitimate, structural changes must be designed so that options that satisfy human needs be explored, and to make clear to all parties the costs and consequences of resistance to change.<sup>52</sup> States can contain conflicts by coercive power only in the short term. It is impossible to eliminate conflict, because it is deeprooted in the expression of human needs. Conflict resolution is a peaceful method for instituting structural changes.

The second possibility is that the states are changed by the constructive third system, especially peace movements. As long as wars are institutionalized in international society, peace can not be attained. This is the primary reason why peace movements respond to the states and international society. The peace movements' essential challenge is to the states' continuing efforts to preserve for themselves a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, and to international society's institutionalization of the practice of war. According to Galtung, the struggle of peace movements is not against the state monopoly on military power but against state monopoly on coercive power in general. Furthermore, peace movements question whether the state can use violence legitimately or not.<sup>53</sup> If the state can use violence to contain conflicts, it is illegitimate and it is impossible to solve conflicts. And as Galtung argues, peace movements stand for a general reduction of the means of violence; the ultimate goal being the abolition of wars as a social institution.<sup>54</sup> If the state can not find a way to abolish wars as the social and international institution, the state can not establish the legitimacy of its authority.

\*I am grateful to assistance and comments for Hugh Nicoll. It goes without saying that all remaining errors are mine.

## Notes

1. Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism : Critical Theory and International Relations* (London : Macmillan, 1990), p.3.
2. Kalevi Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline : Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (Boston : Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp.7-10.
3. Idid.
4. Peter Wallensteen and Margarete Sollenberg, "After the Cold War: Emerging Patterns of Armed Conflict 1989-94," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.32, No.3 (August 1995), p.345.
5. Richard E. Rubenstein, "Unanticipated Conflict and the Crisis of Social Theory," in John Burton and Frank Dukes, eds., *Conflict : Readings in Management and Resolution* (London : Macmillan, 1990), p.318.
6. I do not use a concept of order as a normative and desirable condition, but as an arrangement. The order in world order means the way in which four systems are arranged in relation to one another.
7. J. David Singer, *The Correlates of War : Vol.1* (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp.22-23. Richard Falk, Chadwick F. Alger and John Burton have the similar viewpoint. Richard Falk, *The Promise of World Order: Essays in Normative International Relations* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).

Chadwick F. Alger, "Bridging the Micro and the Macro in International Relations," *Alternatives*, Vol.9, No.3 (Winter 1984-85), pp.319-344. John Burton, *Deviance, Terrorism and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979).

8. Influential theorists who assume the fundamental importance of basic human needs include Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, Second Edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1954); Len Doyal and Ian Gough, *A Theory of Human Need* (London: Macmillan, 1991); Christian Bay, *Strategies of Political Emancipation* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); John Burton, and contributors of Roger A. Coate and Jerel A. Rosati, eds., *The Power of Human Needs in World Society* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988)

9. Johan Galtung, "International Development in Human Perspective" in Roger A. Coate and Jerel A. Rosati, eds., *ibid.*, pp.131-133.

10. Richard Falk, Marc Nerfin, and Ralph Pettman point out that there are three systems in different contexts. But they do not use the concept of the fourth system. See Richard Falk, *op.cit.*; Marc Nerfin, "Neither Prince nor Merchant: An Introduction to the Third system," in Krishna Ahooja-Patel, Anne Gordon Drabek and Marc Nerfin, eds., *World Economy in Transition* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1986), pp. 47-59; Ralph Pettman, *International Politics: Balance of Power, Balance of Production, Balance of Ideologies* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991).

11. Johan Galtung, *Peace and Development in the Pacific Hemisphere* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), p.1.

12. *Ibid.*, pp.1-2.

13. Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.27, No.3 (August 1990), p.292.

14. Johan Galtung, "Why the Concerns with Ways of Life?," in Ian Miles and John Irvine, eds., *The Poverty of Progress: Changing Ways of Life in Industrial Societies* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1986), pp.14-20.

15. Galtung uses metaphors of boiling and freezing to explain reaction and inaction. Johan Galtung, "International Development in Human Perspective" in Roger A. Coate and Jerel A. Rosati, eds., *op.cit.* p.132.

16. Erich Fromm, *The Sane Society*, Second Enlarged Edition (London: Routledge, 1991), p.19.

17. John Burton, *op.cit.*, pp.78-79.

18. John Burton, *Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of International Crisis* (Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 1984), p.13.

19. R.J.B. Walker, *One World, Many Worlds: Struggle for a Just World Peace* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), p.26

20. A work of these social movements is Paul Ekins, *A World Order: Grassroots Movements for Global Change* (London: Routledge, 1992).

21. R.J.B. Walker, *op.cit.*, p.91.

22. Martin Shaw, *Global Society and International Relations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p.22.

23. R.J.B. Walker and Saul Mendlovitz, "Peace, Politics and Contemporary Social Movements," in Saul Mendlovitz and R.J.B. Walker, eds., *Towards Just World Order: Perspectives from Social Movements* (London: Butterworths, 1987), p.8.

24. Martin Shaw, "Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond Social Movements Approach," *Millennium*, Vol.23, No.3 (1994), p.655.

25. Achawick F. Alger, "Perceiving, Analysing and Coping with the Local-Global Nexus," *International Social Science Journal*, Vol.117 (August 1988), pp.321-340.

26. Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (New Jersey: Leicester University Press, 1977), p.113.

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